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SHOULD RACIALLY BIASED HATE 
SPEECH BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY 






In popular memory and most published accounts, The 
First Amendment of the US Constitution promises that, among 
other things, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”1 At face value, the mean-
ing of the First Amendment appears self-evident: the US Gov-
ernment cannot pass any law that in any way restricts what 
people can say or publish in the United States. But this inter-
pretation, and support for complete freedom of speech, be-
comes more difficult when one considers the wide variety of 
shocking, offensive, cruel and appalling things people can 
come up with to say to and about each other. Interestingly, 
early in United States history the First Amendment was not 
seen by the government as the binding agreement to refrain 
from restricting all speech that it is viewed as today; in fact, 
within just a few years of the First Amendment becoming part 
of the Constitution, there were successful (albeit, unpopular 
and quickly overturned) attempts to criminalize certain unfa-
vorable speech directed at the government. Anthony Lewis 
                                               
1 Note: For the purposes of this essay, speech includes both direct 
and symbolic speech–so, not only spoken and written words, but 
also actions taken in order to communicate a message. This follows 
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2 
notes that, although this early speech law never went to the 
Supreme Court, “if it had been, the Court would almost cer-
tainly have upheld the law.”2 Today, the interpretation of the 
First Amendment accepted by the United States Supreme 
Court has shifted closer to the face-value reading of the First 
Amendment, and both state governments and the federal gov-
ernment are held to high standards of speech protection. Cur-
rently, restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny tests, 
meaning that those defending the law must demonstrate both 
that the speech issue could not be handled some other way and 
that the problem is pressing enough to warrant legal re-
striction.3 This is a test that is extremely difficult to pass, and 
most restrictions targeted at speech fail to pass this test, result-
ing in a legal culture in which legislators rarely attempt to 
make restrictions on speech and in which people are free to 
say more or less whatever they want to (and any brief survey 
of social media will reveal that many are quite happy to take 
full advantage of this freedom).  
In this paper, I will discuss two Supreme Court cases 
concerning legislation with which state and local governments 
attempted, and ultimately failed, to punish a specific category 
of speech: racially biased hate speech. My goal is to demon-
strate that, although current United States Supreme Court doc-
trine holds that laws specifically targeting racially biased hate 
speech are unconstitutional, the nature of racially biased hate 
speech is such that it should be a legitimate exception to the 
rule that law cannot proscribe the expression of certain ideas.  
In the first section of this paper, I will overview the 
court cases, providing the arguments the Court gave for each 
                                               
2 Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007), 11, 15. 
3 John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the 
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings 






















decision. In the second section, I will compare these argu-
ments to the classic argument in favor of free speech presented 
by John Stuart Mill. In the third section, I will present argu-
ments in favor of hate speech regulation from critical race the-
orists. In the fourth section, I will present responses to these 
critical race theorists from modern scholars who oppose hate 
speech regulation. And in the final section, I will present my 
own critique of the Supreme Court’s decisions and counterar-
guments to the arguments presented by Mill and those oppo-
nents of hate speech regulation discussed in the third section. 
I will also attempt to present a version of hate speech law that 
would allow hate speech to be legally recognized as unac-
ceptable, while avoiding some of the consequences that those 
opposed to hate speech regulation fear.  
 
Supreme Court Cases 
 
The United States Supreme Court cases I will focus 
on are R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Virginia v. Black (referred 
to throughout the rest of this paper as R.A.V. and Virginia, re-
spectively). The first case, R.A.V., concerns a teenager who 
was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance for burning a cross in a black family’s front yard.4 The 
United States Supreme Court found that the St. Paul ordinance 
was “facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise 
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addresses.”5 That is to say, the law was unconstitutional be-
cause it proscribed speech based on its content—it specifically 
targeted speech that “arouses anger... on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender” as legally unacceptable, but 
left speech that arouses anger on other bases protected. The 
court explained that, while the ordinance only applied to bi-
                                               
4 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  









Furman Humanities Review 
 
4 
ased speech that constituted “fighting words,” which the Su-
preme Court has recognized as proscribable, it was unconsti-
tutional because it effectively allowed the government to pick 
and choose which topics of fighting words were acceptable 
and which were not. (“Fighting words” is a term for a category 
of speech first recognized as proscribable by the Supreme 
Court in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire and is defined by the 
Court as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”)6 As Justice 
Antonin Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court, this law 
could create a situation in which one side of a debate could say 
whatever it wanted to, whereas the other side could not—he 
explains this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which a 
person could say “that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegot-
ten; but not that all ‘papists’ are”; and so Catholics would be 
permitted to use whatever language they like, but anti-Catho-
lics would be limited to tamer speech.7 
In the second case, Virginia, the Court examined a law 
which “makes it a felony ‘for any person … , with the intent 
of intimidating any person or group … , to burn … a cross on 
the property of another, a highway or other public place,’ and 
specifies that ‘[a]ny such burning … shall be prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.’”8 The Su-
preme Court held that intimidation is a legitimate exception to 
First Amendment protection, as well as that states could spe-
cifically ban cross burning when the intent of the cross burning 
is to intimidate; however, the Court found the statute uncon-
stitutional as it was written, because of its prima facie assump-
tion that cross burning was always intended to intimidate.9 In 
                                               
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942). 
7 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.  
8 Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003). 
9 Note: prima facie comes from the Latin for “at first sight,” and 




















her opinion for the court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor ex-
plained that “the act of burning a cross may mean that a person 
is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation, or it 
may mean only that the person is engaged in core political 
speech.”10  In other words, to assume that cross burning in 
every case is intended to intimidate could be to punish some-
one who burned a cross not in order to intimidate, but rather 
to make a point that contributes to political discussion. Inter-
estingly, the court held that cross burning could be specifically 
banned because of the historical association of cross burning 
with the Ku Klux Klan, known for its extreme racial violence 
and hate speech, but that this was consistent with the decision 
in R.A.V. because the Virginia statute did not specify that cross 
burning was illegal when intended to intimidate based on reli-
gion, race or sex; it simply restricted cross burning in all cases 
in which it was intended to intimidate.  
The Virginia decision could be seen as a victory for 
supporters of hate speech regulation, and it is certainly more 
of a victory than R.A.V., but, as we will see below, its failure 
to specifically condemn racially biased hate speech and the 
Court’s rejection that cross burning can be taken to always im-
ply intimidation, despite the fact that the Court acknowledged 
its association with racial violence and intimidation, means 
that it is not the direct kind of restriction on hate speech that 
hate speech regulation advocates desire. 
 
A Classic Free Speech Argument 
 
As mentioned above, in the United States’ infancy the 
Supreme Court likely would not have been as opposed to spe-
cific content discrimination in either state or federal law as it 
                                               
For more clarification, see the entry on Prima facie in the Wex le-
gal dictionary from Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Insti-
tute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie. 
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is today. While it might seem unbelievable to us now, in 1798 
the Senate passed a bill which criminalized “any false, scan-
dalous and malicious writing or writings against the govern-
ment of the United States, or either house of the Congress… 
or the President.”11 Called the Sedition Act, this law was a di-
rect content restriction on negative writings about the govern-
ment. The arguments used in the United States for shifting 
away from laws such as the Sedition Act echo arguments 
found in John Stuart Mill’s book On Liberty, published in 
1859. In this book, Mill argues that (almost)  no speech should 
be regulated, because all speech, even speech that is consid-
ered “false and pernicious,” can contribute to the exchange of 
ideas and pursuit of truth.12 Mill sees three reasons not to reg-
ulate speech in general. First, he argues that “all silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility”;13 that is to say, 
when the government chooses to punish certain speech or 
ideas, it is assuming that it knows what the correct opinion 
should be. Mill notes that throughout history, historical figures 
that in Mill’s day were considered great teachers, such as Jesus 
and Socrates, were executed for spreading supposedly bad 
ideas in the time periods in which they lived.14 Another reason 
Mill provides to not regulate even negatively-viewed speech 
is that often, the so-called false opinion and so-called true 
opinion both contain part of the truth; he claims that it is rare 
that one is completely true and the other completely false and, 
therefore, access to both sides of an argument are necessary in 
order to come to the truth.15  
Mill’s next reason not to regulate any kind of speech 
is that any opinion, “however true… if it is not fully, fre-
quently, and fearlessly discussed… will be held as a dead 
                                               
11 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That we Hate, 11. 
12 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Hackett, 
1978), 18–19. 
13 Mill, On Liberty, 17. 
14 Mill, 23.  




















dogma, not a living truth.”16 Mill explains that, in order for an 
idea not to become a dead dogma (that is, a kind of blindly, 
unquestioningly accepted catechism, rather than a compelling 
intellectual idea), those who hold that idea must be exposed to 
objections to that idea. What’s more, he argues, in order for 
the hearer to receive the “most plausible and most persuasive 
form” of the opposing argument, the objections must be pre-
sented by those who believe the so-called false view, rather 
than by someone who simply knows the argument but does not 
believe it.17 This would require those holding the false idea to 
be allowed to speak their beliefs exactly as they believe them, 
rather than presenting the idea in a tame, third-person kind of 
way. 
Mill was specifically concerned with the kind of si-
lencing of religious and political discussion present in England 
and the early United States. Historical speech laws often in-
cluded what would be categorized as content-based re-
strictions on speech that today we recognize as valuable, such 
as political and religious dissent. By restricting certain con-
tent, these laws regulated the ideas presented in the speech, 
rather than simply the aggressive nature or fighting-word sta-
tus of such speech, and were legitimized by arguments that the 
regulated speech was either untrue or of such offensive nature 
that it should not be permitted in public discourse. Under-
standing this context of speech repression is important to un-
derstanding why Mill argued in favor of nearly total freedom 
of speech and why it is now so difficult to argue for regulation 
directed at a specific subject of speech in the United States, 
even when the speech is deeply offensive and recognized to be 
based on untruth, as racially-biased hate speech is. 
It should be noted that Mill allows for some speech (or 
actions in general) to be regulated when such action or speech 
                                               
16 Mill, 34.  
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would cause specific harm to others.18 This idea is often called 
the harm principle. (It can be argued that hate speech directly 
causes harm to others, both physically and mentally, although, 
since Mill’s focus was not on hate speech, he does not address 
this possibility; I will address this idea further in the subse-
quent sections of this paper.) Mill’s only example of a case in 
which speech causes justly regulable harm is the case of a man 
inciting an angry mob by declaring that “corn dealers are starv-
ers of the poor.” 19 Mill explains that, in this case, the speech 
is not regulable because of the idea it expresses, but rather be-
cause it occurs in front of an angry mob gathered at the house 
of a corn dealer and will most likely incite them to harm the 
corn dealer; to Mill, such speech would be acceptable if it did 
not occur in that specific context.20 Because much of what is 
considered hate speech by its broadest definition (which 
would include not only angry incitements to violence but also 
racist speech in general) is not presented in a directly compa-
rable manner to this example, it would seem that Mill would 
only support regulating hate speech that can be seen as a direct 
incitement to harm, if he were to enter the discussion today. 
Mill’s harm principle is similar in many ways to the fighting-
words doctrine discussed in Chaplinksy, R.A.V. and Virginia, 
because the nature of fighting words is to either incite or inflict 
harm.  
 
An Argument from Critical Race Theory 
 
Those who support regulation of racially charged hate 
speech, whether embodied in state legal codes or in the rules 
of public colleges, find themselves in a tight spot in the face 
of the reversal of historical speech laws and current legal doc-
                                               
18 Mill, 9. 
19 Mill, On Liberty, 53. 





















trine on hate speech. Although advocates of hate speech re-
strictions want such restrictions not to end political discussion, 
but rather to protect those people who have historically been 
subject to extreme discrimination and violence based on their 
membership in minority groups (for example, race, gender, re-
ligion, and sexual orientation), such advocates are often des-
ignated as “thought police” by opponents, a designation that 
implies that they do not support open discussion.21 In this sec-
tion, I want to examine the view held by some of the most 
outspoken supporters of hate speech regulation, the critical 
race theorists, and why they think that racially biased hate 
speech can be treated as an exception to the rule that govern-
ment cannot implement content-based restrictions on speech. 
Critical race theory is based on six “defining ele-
ments,” presented in Words That Wound as follows:  
 
Critical race theory recognizes that racism is endemic 
to American life…. Critical race theory expresses 
skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutral-
ity, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy…. 
Critical race theory challenges ahistoricism and in-
sists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law…. 
Critical race theory insists on recognition of the ex-
periential knowledge of people of color… in analyz-
ing law and society…. Critical race theory is inter-
disciplinary and eclectic…. [and] Critical race theory 
works toward the end of eliminating racial oppres-
sion as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of 
oppression.22 
 
                                               
21 Charles R. Lawrence III et. al, eds., introduction to  Words That 
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 2. 
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Based on these beliefs and goals, critical race theorists argue 
that racially biased hate speech can be legitimately singled out 
for restriction, despite the fact that this would create a content-
based restriction, because of the long history of racial discrim-
ination such speech embodies and because eliminating such 
speech would help alleviate the still-existing problems faced 
by racial minorities today. The critical race theorists often pro-
vide personal examples of being subjected to hate speech in 
order to support their claims; one such example is a “rash of 
hate tracts [that]… appeared in [their] mail,” an experience 
which caused them to “[walk] more quickly to [their] cars after 
late nights at the office and [to glance] more often over [their] 
shoulders as [they] jogged the trails around [their] cam-
puses.”23 Charles Lawrence III provides another personal ex-
ample, writing about a hate speech incident directed at his own 
family members in which racist drawings, slurs and threats 
were written at the school where his sister and nephews 
worked and attended classes, respectively. 24  Though some 
may argue that crude, slur-filled drawings or anonymous tracts 
may not constitute a true threat, or may only happen rarely and 
therefore not be a widespread enough issue for laws to be spe-
cifically directed at racially biased speech, for critical race the-
orists, the association of such speech with lynching and racial 
discrimination, and the extreme fear caused by being targeted 
by such speech, warrants laws that explicitly target racial hate 
speech. Lawrence notes that hate speech has a silencing effect 
on those it targets; although supposedly still free to speak, the 
shock of being the target of hate speech renders the person tar-
geted unable to respond or participate in the discussion at 
hand, as was the case for one of Lawrence’s students, who 
                                               
23 Lawrence et. al, 7. 
24 Charles R. Lawrence III, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus” in Words That Wound: Critical Race 
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé 




















found himself unable to respond when being verbally attacked 
for being gay.25 This demonstrates another side of the critical 
race theorists’ argument for hate speech regulation, which is 
that the regulation of hate speech may actually be more con-
ducive to a culture of free, open discussion. 
Critical race theorists do not necessarily agree on the 
extent to which hate speech should be regulated by law; Mari 
J. Matsuda, for example, argues that hate speech restriction 
should focus on speech where “the message is of racial inferi-
ority… the message is directed at a historically oppressed 
group… [and] the message is persecutory, hateful, and degrad-
ing.”26 Such a definition of hate speech, although appealing to 
those who support the critical race theorists’ goals, would nat-
urally create the problem of one-sided debate that Justice 
Scalia warned of in R.A.V. and would likely be too broad a 
definition of hate speech to successfully use for legislation.  
On the other hand, Charles R. Lawrence III advocates legisla-
tion that defines proscribable speech simply as “face-to-face 
racial vilification.”27 Lawrence’s description of such speech 
echoes the “fighting words” doctrine mentioned above, which 
was first presented by the United States Supreme Court in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, but focuses it directly at ra-
cially biased hate speech. In fact, Lawrence’s definition of 
hate speech would support a law almost exactly like the law 
thrown out in R.A.V.; it seems that in response to the court’s 
decision, Lawrence would counter that racially biased hate 
speech can be specifically targeted as long as the law is 
worded in a way that allows both sides of any race debate to 
have protection. Based on Lawrence’s definition, it does not 
                                               
25 Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” 53. 
26 Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim’s Story” in Words that Wound: Critical Race The-
ory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993),  36.  
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matter if one is a member of a racial group that has been his-
torically ostracized or has historically been the one that ostra-
cizes—Lawrence, unlike Matsuda, does not specify that hate 
speech regulation should punish only hate speech directed at 
members of historically oppressed racial groups, and in this 
way better avoids the one-sidedness that Scalia lamented in 
R.A.V. while still advocating for law that restricts racial hate 
speech as a category. 
 
Modern Counter-Arguments to Critical Race Theorists 
 
Modern defenders of free speech who oppose critical 
race theorists present a number of reasons not to legislate 
against racially biased hate speech beyond those provided in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions and by Mill.  
First, some opponents of hate speech regulation coun-
ter that government regulations on racist hate speech are un-
warranted because such regulations deny respect for the au-
tonomy of the speaker, which is a key foundation for the 
legitimacy of our government. As C. Edwin Baker argues, “the 
legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people’s 
equality and autonomy and… as a purely formal matter, the 
state only respects people’s autonomy if it allows people in 
their speech to express their own values – no matter what these 
values are.”28 That is to say, a government is only legitimate if 
it allows people to speak their mind completely and to make 
choices for themselves in what to think, even if their ideas are 
hateful and offensive. It follows from this that to restrict hate 
speech, although it may appear to be a good decision, would 
be to destroy the legitimacy of the government. Baker agrees 
with critical race theorists that the government must also pro-
tect the equality of its citizens, but he adds that this does not 
                                               
28 C. Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” in Extreme 
Speech and Democracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, (Ox-





















mean that the government should punish private citizens for 
saying things that “[do] not respect others’ equality and dig-
nity.”29 Such speech is, to Baker, a matter of choice and per-
sonal belief, rather than a substantial infringement on the 
rights of minorities, and therefore the government should not 
have a say in what people say and believe. The tendency of 
past governments to dictate what people could or could not say 
and believe is the reason we have today developed such a 
strong aversion to speech regulation, and to Baker there is 
more substantial ground to argue that the governments’ re-
striction of hate speech infringes on a person’s right to auton-
omy than to argue that an individual’s use of hate speech in-
fringes on the rights of the individual (or group) targeted by 
the hate speech. 
Another opponent of hate speech regulation, John T. 
Bennett, also addresses critical race theorists’ arguments for 
hate speech regulation. In addition to arguing that government 
should not dictate what can or cannot be said, Bennett ques-
tions the evidence of harms from hate speech. Bennett does 
not deny that there is any evidence whatsoever of harm from 
hate speech; however, he denies that this evidence is so strong 
as to warrant hate speech regulation. Bennett asserts that one 
such harm attributed to hate speech, which is social inequality, 
is not attributable to hate speech and racism after all, but rather 
to “cultural norms that are unrelated to racism.”30 Bennett calls 
this view the “cultural perspective” and explains that “the cul-
tural perspective finds that…various inequalities are caused in 
large part by the distinct norms, habits, and lifestyles of differ-
ent people within different communities.”31 Bennett claims in 
                                               
29 Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 143. 
30 John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the 
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43 (2016): 478, https://advance-
lexis-com.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1f10-
416a-bf13-9586bf0beb9e/?context=1516831. 
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opposition to critical race theorists that inequality as it exists 
in the United States today is not caused by inherent structural 
racism, but rather by “varying norms, habits, preferences, and 
conscious decisions” taken by members of the minority racial 
groups that currently experience unequal outcomes compared 
to members of the majority racial group.32 Put more simply, 
Bennett argues that the inequality experienced today by people 
who have historically been discriminated against because of 
their race is not because of the lingering effects of racism in 
society; instead, he argues that minorities have caused the cur-
rent inequality through their own decisions, and implies that 
blaming these problems on racism, and specifically racist 
speech, is to shift the focus onto the wrong problem.  
Bennett explains further that another harm attributed 
to hate speech, psycho-emotional harm, is also problematic, 
because it is a difficult harm to measure, because it is inher-
ently subjective, and because, according to him, research into 
this harm does not show that hate speech causes long-term 
psychological harm.33 He writes, in an explanation of a study 
which attempted to determine whether hate speech negatively 
impacts self-esteem of young Blacks in the long term using 
data gathered between 1960 and 1998, “if hate speech in 
American society is causing psycho-emotional harm, this has 
not led to a measurable impact on self-reported self-esteem.”34 
Bennett does not deny that those who are targeted by hate 
speech experience any harm whatsoever, but rather argues that 
the evidence of long-lasting harm is not strong enough to war-
rant the level of strict hate speech regulation some critical race 
theorists want. 
Bennett also notes that critical race theorists use em-
pirical data which is gathered by academics who “suffer from 
                                               
 
32 Bennett, 469. 
33 Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 487. 





















deeply rooted and longstanding ideological bias.”35 Bennett 
explains that this bias takes two forms: first, he claims that 
many proponents of hate speech regulation “exaggerate the 
prevalence of racism and sexism in American life,” even as 
racism itself has declined and anti-racism has become the 
norm.36 Second, Bennett notes that this bias results in the ex-
clusion of conservative academics, who (like Bennett) might 
question the prevalence of hate speech and the necessity to 
regulate it. 37  According to Bennett, the currently accepted 
opinion on hate speech among academics has already created 
a culture of speech where, even though certain ideas and 
speech may not be illegal, people are afraid to speak their 
minds because of the possibility of being socially punished—
not for using racially-charged hate speech, but rather for argu-
ing that such speech may not need to be regulated.  
Both Baker and Bennett also address the argument 
that hate speech causes harm, and must therefore be regulated, 
by countering that hate speech regulations may worsen the 
problems that proponents of hate speech regulations want to 
fix. For example, Bennett notes that hate speech regulations 
would be likely to negatively impact racial harmony in the 
United States. He explains that “if hate speech laws were en-
acted, reasonable people would perceive racial favoritism in 
their implementation,” meaning that hate speech regulation 
would be likely to increase animosity between racial groups, 
because such regulations, as presented by scholars such as 
Matsuda, would likely favor one racial group over another.38 
Baker agrees with this, noting that “speech prohibitions can 
increase… racist individuals’ or groups’ sense of oppression 
and, thereby, sense that they must act.”39 He also asserts that 
                                               
35 Bennett, 471. 
36 Bennett, 474. 
37 Bennett, 473. 
38 Bennett, “”The Harm in Hate Speech,” 531. 
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regulation of hate speech will make it more difficult to identify 
potential perpetrators of racial violence, because such regula-
tions will force proponents of hate speech to go underground 
and thereby become harder to trace. 40  So, instead of hate 
speech regulation protecting minority groups from harm, 
Baker and Bennett argue that hate speech regulations will ul-
timately cause more harm. 
 
My Response to the Above Arguments 
 
My own view on hate speech regulation recognizes 
that freedom of speech is a necessary and important freedom 
in any country that claims to value the rights of the people who 
live there; however, I agree with the critical race theorists that 
racially biased hate speech should be an exception to the rule 
and that states can legitimately write laws that punish extreme 
racial hate speech.  
Before completely laying out my own view, I need to 
respond to the arguments against hate speech restriction that 
were presented above. First, in response to Mill: Mill argues 
that all speech must be allowed in order to pursue truth. Alt-
hough I agree that the search for truth is important, I think it is 
difficult to argue that hate speech seriously contributes to the 
pursuit of truth. Of course, there is a possibility of discrimina-
tory, racist speech which may appear to contribute to this 
search for truth, such as in a story that Mari Matsuda calls 
“The Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist,” in which a 
racist argument is portrayed as having scientific backing and 
is presented in a classroom or lecture setting, thereby bearing 
resemblance to actual academic debate and pursuit of truth.41 
However, I think even Mill would be hard-pressed to show 
what benefit or hint of the truth could be found in yelling de-
rogatory names, burning crosses in black families’ yards, or 
                                               
40 Baker, 152. 




















drawing pictures of swastikas outside dorm rooms. At least the 
social scientist, in presenting his racially biased views in an 
academic manner, puts forth his argument in the kind of set-
ting that allows for discussion; that is to say, by presenting his 
views in an academic setting, he seems to invite the possibility 
of the kind of discussion of ideas Mill wants us to have. On 
the other hand, racist speech that takes the form of a slur, a 
display of a hateful symbol, or an act of vandalism does not 
ask for engagement; it seeks to intimidate others into fear and 
silence.  
Also, banning hate speech and banning disagreement 
are not necessarily the same thing. Or, they do not have to be. 
Part of the fear addressed above is that hate speech will be so 
broadly defined as to include speech that should be protected, 
including speech that is merely in opposition to the prevailing 
view. This is one of the potential problems with Matsuda’s 
definition of hate speech. A number of claims made specifi-
cally by Bennett could be considered racist by his readers, re-
gardless of whether he is trying to be racist or not, and there 
are those would argue that all even vaguely racist speech is 
hate speech. Such an argument would make it possible for 
these readers to accuse Bennett of hate speech, even though it 
seems a stretch to call what he says hate speech compared to 
the more extreme examples of hate speech already mentioned. 
This reveals a need to define hate speech specifically, in order 
to avoid creating a culture where those who may not intend to 
cause harm feel like they cannot speak, because they cannot 
ask questions or challenge prevailing views without being ac-
cused of hate speech. For this reason, I find myself leaning 
toward Lawrence’s definition of hate speech as “face-to-face 
racial vilification.”42 However, I would ensure the definition 
included acts that might not be strictly face-to-face, such as 
posting up a poster with demeaning racial images, or display-
ing symbols, such as the swastika or a burning cross, which 
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would likely cause emotional harm by their proximity to mem-
bers of minority groups. Either way, a narrower definition of 
hate speech would allow those with unpopular, and even po-
tentially racist, opinions to still speak their opinions—they just 
would not be able to use words that inherently harm or silence 
others in order to express these opinions. 
Of course, narrowly defining hate speech and recog-
nizing that hate speech does not contribute to a pursuit of truth 
does not seem enough to satisfy Baker and Bennett. Baker says 
that the government must respect its citizens’ autonomy by al-
lowing them to speak their opinions freely and argues that this 
respect must be maintained “irrespective of how this expres-
sive content harms other people.”43 This may just be an unfor-
tunate wording, although it is interesting that, when presenting 
possible evidence that might convince him that hate speech 
regulation would be beneficial, Baker only suggests that he 
would be convinced by evidence showing that hate speech in-
cites racist acts (by racists), and he does not mention that he 
would be convinced if he was shown evidence that hate speech 
harmed its targets in and of itself.44  Allowing someone to 
speak even if it causes harm to another person seems to go 
directly against the purpose of government. I agree with Baker 
that the government must respect the autonomy of its citizens; 
however, the law must put some limits on a person’s autonomy 
in order to protect other people; this is, of course, why there 
are laws against stealing and murder, and why pedophiles can-
not use the argument of sexual autonomy to justify sexual acts 
with minors. A person’s freedom of choice to act ends when 
their action harms another person.  
Hidden within Baker’s statement that speech must be 
freely allowed regardless of harm, is the argument that speech 
does not cause true harm in the same way that murder, steal-
ing, and sexual abuse cause harm. This is interesting, as Baker 
                                               
43 Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 142. 





















seemingly disagrees with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chaplinsky, because the Court’s definition of fighting words, 
as quoted above, recognizes that certain words can cause 
harm.  
Bennett’s specific arguments against hate speech, on 
the other hand, are somewhat more controversial. First, his ar-
gument that inequality is not caused by racism seems quite 
false; even if it is true that not all current inequality is caused 
directly by racism, there are cases where racism can be shown 
to underly situations of inequality. This can be seen specifi-
cally in the higher incarceration rates of Blacks for drug 
crimes, despite whites being a larger portion of the drug user 
population, as well as in more severe sentences for Blacks ver-
sus whites when similar crimes are committed.45 Second, Ben-
nett, unlike Baker, allows that hate speech may cause actual 
harm to those targeted by it, but he denies that it is enough 
harm to warrant restriction. It is interesting to note that the 
study Baker uses to demonstrate that hate speech does not 
cause long-term harm focuses on the impact of hate speech on 
self-esteem, and does not address other long-term psycho-
emotional harms that may occur, such as fear of going to cer-
tain locations (such as a classroom or a dorm where one was 
subject to hate speech). It seems both Bennett and Baker reject 
the personal experience of those targeted by racist hate speech. 
If you ask the Black family who was directly targeted by the 
burning cross at the heart of the controversy in R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, would they say there was no long-term psychological 
harm? In the example mentioned above, in which Lawrence’s 
family was targeted by racist drawings, he writes that, on vis-
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iting his family after the incident, the pain and injury was ob-
vious, that “their faces betrayed the aftershock of a recently 
inflicted blow and a newly discovered vulnerability.”46 Could 
Bennett and Baker deny that such an experience would not 
have long-term effects on Lawrence’s family, especially the 
children who realized they went to school with people who 
were willing to say such things about them? It is possible that 
more commonplace, subtle racist speech  may not have meas-
urable long-term effects (although I am not totally convinced 
this is true), but it seems difficult and wrong to deny the indi-
vidual experience of those targeted directly by the most violent 
and direct instances of hate speech.  
The question also arises of why it matters to have ra-
cially biased hate speech regulation specifically, if such hate 
speech could fall under legislation, such as the law in Virginia, 
that regulates fighting words in general. Simply proscribing 
hate speech within more general fighting words laws might 
appeal to Bennett, since, as discussed above, he says that rea-
sonable people will see restrictions that specifically regulate 
hate speech as favoring one side over another, and that aca-
demics who support such legislation are deeply biased. Ben-
nett is probably right in saying that racial hate speech ordi-
nances will tend to favor one side over another, even if not 
written in a way that asks for such one-sided application, see-
ing as it likely would be more difficult (but not impossible) for 
a white person to show that she is the victim of hate speech 
than it would be for a Black person, Jewish person, or person 
of any other minority group. It is also more likely that people 
of color will bring up allegations of hate speech and win, be-
cause people of color are more often targeted by hate speech 
and hate crimes (however, it should be noted again that whites 
would also be able to be recognized as victims of hate speech 
under the kind of hate speech laws I am arguing for, just as 
whites can and have been recognized as victims of hate crimes 
                                               
 




















under current hate crime laws).47 This seemingly unfair appli-
cation comes about because derogatory speech and symbols 
directed at a white person do not carry with them the same 
history of oppression that such speech directed at a person of 
another race would. However, this same history of oppression 
is exactly what motivates those academics who support hate 
speech regulation. They may appear to be biased, but this is 
because most critical race theorists are themselves members of 
minority groups who have experienced extreme discrimina-
tion in United States history; in a sense, regulation specifically 
directed at hate speech is a small way of making up for the 
hundreds of years in which people of color were excluded 
from government, openly discriminated against, enslaved, and 
beaten all because of their ethnicity and skin color.  
Again, I admit that this sort of argument can be 
viewed as biased against a specific category of disfavored 
speech; however, I do not think there is inherently something 
wrong with different treatment of disfavored speech in this 
case. Hate speech is different from other sorts of disfavored 
speech, such as anti-government and anti-war speech, which 
have also been historically been targeted by speech regulation 
in the United States.48 The latter two forms of speech are po-
litical speech which attack the government and can reasonably 
be seen to contribute to the search for truth because of their 
nature as political speech. However, racially biased hate 
speech specifically attacks people based on nothing other than 
their race, and, as mentioned above, cannot reasonably be con-
sidered a part of the search for truth.  
I need to also address Baker and Bennett’s arguments 
that hate speech regulation will unintentionally cause more 
                                               
47 See Wen Cheng, William Ickes, and Jared B. Kenworthy, “The 
Phenomenon of Hate Crimes in the United States,” Journal of Ap-
plied Social Psychology 43, no. 4 (2013): 761–794, https://doi-
org.libproxy.furman.edu/10.1111/jasp.12004. 
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harm. Bennett’s reason for this argument relates to the argu-
ment just mentioned, which is that “reasonable people would 
perceive racial favoritism in their implementation.”49 As I al-
ready said, I think this is true, but I also think many reasonable 
people are capable of recognizing that the problem addressed 
by hate speech regulation carries with it a history that allows 
for an exception to the rule that law cannot be biased against 
certain ideas. And even if reasonable people disagree with this 
(I will not claim that Bennett or Baker are unreasonable peo-
ple), they are unlikely to lash out at minority groups if hate 
speech laws are enacted. The problem, then, seems to lie with 
unreasonable people; that is to say, those who want to use the 
most violent hate speech: hate groups, such as Neo-Nazis and 
white supremacists. As mentioned before, Baker says that hate 
speech regulation will cause such unreasonable people to feel 
attacked and “increase… [their] sense that they must act,” as 
well as force them to move underground where their ideas can 
fester.50 This is a difficult argument to counter. First, I argue 
that hate speech regulation would not necessarily force these 
groups entirely underground, because, as I have already ad-
mitted, I do not think that hate speech regulation can be 
worded to include every instance of racist speech, but only the 
most hurtful forms of direct racial vilification. Second, if by 
increasing the sense that they must act, Baker means that these 
groups will be prompted to use more violence, then that simply 
goes to show that racist ideas in fact are still prevalent enough 
to cause concern, which disproves Bennett’s assertion that rac-
ism is no longer a big enough issue to warrant hate speech leg-
islation. Also, even though hate groups might claim that being 
targeted by hate speech regulation is a legitimate reason to use 
violence, such an argument would not hold up in any court. 
This may show that the government needs to do a better job of 
                                               
49 Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 531. 




















identifying and monitoring those who might be likely to com-
mit hate crimes, but it does not show that we should not protect 
the victims of hate speech by directly punishing hate speech 
through legislation. It seems more important to protect those 
that are actually harmed by hate speech, rather than those who 





Ultimately, the debate over hate speech regulation is 
difficult to resolve, and it is admittedly likely that racism will 
find ways to persist even if we accept the need for hate speech 
regulation and enact laws restricting such speech. Despite 
these difficulties, the battle to criminalize hate speech is wor-
thy to be fought, as it provides a way for the United States and 
its state governments to both protect minorities from the very 
real harm that comes from being targeted by hate speech and 
to legally recognize the crimes such speech has historically en-
couraged and embodied as wrong. The goal of hate speech re-
striction is not to end debate; hate speech regulation, specifi-
cally limited to racially-biased fighting words and “face-to-
face vilification,” will still allow for free expression of even 
racist ideas; but it will require that the expression of such ideas 
not occur in such a way to inflict harm on the minority groups 
who have already suffered so much harm throughout United 
States history. I would love to live in a world where hate 
speech regulation is not necessary, but as I have shown, we do 
not yet live in such a world. It is for these reasons that I not 
only argue we need hate speech regulation, but that I also dis-
agree with the Court’s decisions in R.A.V. and Virginia and 
conclude that the Court should allow future such laws to re-
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